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Advances in medicine and surgical technology have re-
sulted in procedures permitting physicians to perform, with
increasing degrees of success, the transfer of human body tissue
from one individual to another.' Such transplants involve skin
grafts, bones, corneas, livers, blood and arteries.2 Also, it is no
longer an uncommon experience for transplantation of human
kidneys from both living and deceased donors. Where a living
donor is involved, both the recipient and donor have subse-
quently lived active and relatively normal lives.
The enthusiasm over these. significant medical advances,
however, must be tempered by a recognition of the ethical and
legal consequences of the transplant situation. The legal re-
sponse to anatomical transplants is only beginning to surface,
therefore the area has not been well defined. Such response
must encompass the respective rights and responsibilities of
the donor, recipient and physician. Initial consideration of the
area must lead to a recognition that legal constraints should
not hamper progress in medical research and technology. Of
equal necessity is the recognition that the patient, particularly
the donor, has a right to know that his life will not be sacrificed
in favor of another.
Anatomical transplants can be undertaken with body parts
from either a living or deceased donor. Because of the different
statues, the legal responses to each situation have evolved sep-
arately. Where the transplant involves a deceased donor, the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act3 governs in most jurisdictions.
Where the donor is living, no such statute generally exists and
the controlling law has been court made. In an area of the law
just beginning to develop, the Wisconsin court has provided
early contributions. Two recent Wisconsin Supreme Court
cases concern the application of the UAGA and the consensual
problem of a living donor who is legally incapable of giving
personal consent to a transplant.
1. R. MORRIS, RESPONSE TO SUBCOMMITTEE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT
VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN, SENATE SUBCOMM. ON EXECUTIE REORGANIZATION, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 435 (1969).
2. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (U.L.A.), Commissioner's Prefactory Note, at 16.
3. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is referred to in this article as the UAGA.
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I. DECEASED DONOR SITUATION
In Wisconsin a transfer of body tissue from a deceased
donor is controlled by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.4 The
drafters of the UAGA recognized the expanding use of human
body tissue in medical research and transplantation and were
aware that pre-UAGA laws inadequately dealt with the situa-
tion. A uniform approach was needed:
both the common law and the present statutory picture is one
of confusion, diversity and inadequacy. This tends to discour-
age anatomical gifts and to create difficulties for physicians,
especially for transplant surgeons.-
A. Historical Development
Under English common law, no property rights existed in a
cadaver that would permit a gift of that body or any part
thereof. The rights of possession and disposition of the body
were solely under ecclesiastic control.' The concept that no
individual could control a corpse was first embraced by Ameri-
can courts in the nineteenth century. An early Missouri case
held that "there is no property right in a corpse, the relations
have, in regard to it, only the right of interment, and this right
having been once exercised. . . no right to the corpse remains
except to protect it from insult."'
During the nineteenth century the question of whether any
property rights existed in a body was frequently litigated. Such
litigation can be traced to several sources including disputes
between the decedent's spouse and next-of-kin concerning the
control of the body for burial purposes, 8 attempts by relatives
to be recompensated by third parties for the alleged mishan-
dling of corpses,' and the expanding need for cadavers in medi-
cal research and teaching.'"
4. Wis. STAT. § 155.06 (1973).
5. UAGA (U.L.A.), Commissioner's Prefatory Note, at 17.
6. P. JACKSON. THE LAW OF CADAVERS 126 (2d ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as LAW
OF CADAVERS].
7. Guthrie v. Weaver, 1 Mo. App. 136, 143 (1876).
8. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetary, 10 R.I. 227, 14 Am. Rep. 667
(1872).
9. Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905).
10. In re Johnson's Estate, 169 Misc. 215, 220, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (1938). The court
noted that alternatives to the shortage of bodies for medical purposes were unauthor-
ized autopsies and body snatching from graveyards. Even murder was used: "the
development of a business in homicide [was] carried on by two enterprising murderers
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As a result, the rigid English position was modified to recog-
nize "a qualified property right, one of custody, control and
disposition of a res that itself is not material property."'" This
"quasi-property"'' 2 right was granted to the person responsible
for burial, usually the spouse or next-of-kin, and extended to a
right of possession for such burial, but did not extend to a
property right in the commercial sense. Interference with this
right "by mutilation or otherwise disturbing the body"14 was
deemed an actionable wrong compensable by pecuniary dam-
ages. Similarly, the improper disinterment of a body became
an actionable form of trespass."5 A demand for an autopsy con-
tracted under an insurance policy was held to be directed to the
person properly in control of the deceased's body, and, if the
demand was not made within a reasonable time after death,
failure by such spouse or next-of-kin to accede to the demand
would not defeat the beneficiaries' claim under the policy. "
Judicial recognition of a quasi-property right in the spouse
or next-of-kin to a decedent's body led to a further question.
Whose intention controlled when the decedent's expressed in-
tention on the disposition of his own body conflicted with that
of his spouse or next-of-kin? Because no property interest was
held to exist in a body, courts often held that the decedent was
incapable of controlling the disposition. The California court in
Enos v. Snyder7 invalidated an attempted testamentary dispo-
sition where the decedent willed his body to his mistress to be
disposed of as she wished, without regard to the desires of his
wife and child:
It follows that a man cannot by will dispose of his dead body.
If there be no property in a dead body it is impossible that
by will or any other instrument that body can be disposed
of.'
8
named Burke and Hare, who obeying the law of supply and demand provided eager
doctors with what they greatly needed but could not legally obtain in sufficient quant-
ity."
11. LAW OF CADAVERS, supra note 6, at 133-34.
12. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetary, 10 R.I. 227, 234, 14 Am. Rep.
667, 670 (1872).
13. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
14. Id. at 310, 50 N.W. at 239.
15. LAW OF CADAVERS, supra note 6, at 176.
16. Johnson v. Banker's Mutual Casualty Co., 129 Minn. 18, 151 N.W. 413 (1915).
17. 131 Cal. 68, 63 P. 170 (1900).
18. Id.. at 69, 63 P. at 171.
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This view is accepted by the author of a familiar treatise on
wills. 9 According to this view, the body is not property which
can be disposed of by will, and the spouse or next-of-kin has a
superior right to determine the place and method of burial. The
minority view, however, seems to embrace the more reasonable
idea that the decedent does have sufficient interest to assert
the method of disposition. Therefore, the right to possession of
a body for preservation and burial would rest with the surviving
spouse or next-of-kin only in the absence of any testamentary
disposition by the decedent himself."0 Qualifying this view, the
New Hampshire court recently held:
It has been said that the wishes of a decedent will be carried
out so far as possible, but that rights in matters of burial or
disinterment are not absolute, and will be governed "by rules
of propriety and reasonableness determinable by a court of
equity upon due application."'"
The problem of who possessed the right to control the dispo-
sition of a body was not entirely settled. The determination was
based on a balance of the conflicting interests. On one hand,
there existed the right of the decedent to determine the proper
method for disposal of his remains. This right was balanced by
the rights of the family, the deceased's spouse or next-of-kin.
With the increasing need for bodies in medical research and
transplantation, a third and sometimes conflicting interest
arose. This was the interest of society to permit the medical
sciences to use cadavers in its effort to prolong life:
The recent advance of the medical profession in the field of
homotransplantation has transposed the question of testa-
mentary disposition from the limited field of family squab-
bles into that of public concern. The pivotal social issue is no
longer the "tender sentiment of the bereaved spouse," but
rather the need of society. This shift was precipitated by the
realization of the lifesaving potential which this new field of
medical craft presents. We have seen more than once that
public welfare may call upon our best citizens for their lives;
why not for the bodies of those of our citizenry who express a
desire that their cadavers be employed for the advance of
science.21
19. W. PAGE, WILLS, § 16.19 (Bowe-Parker Rev., 1960).
20. 47 Minn. at 310, 50 N.W. at 239.
21. Holland v. Metalious, 198 A.2d 654, 655 (N.H. 1964).
22. Note, The Law of Testamentary Disposition - A Legal Barrier to Medical
Advances, 30 TEMp. L.Q. 40, 44 (1956).
[Vol. 59
COMMENTS
The common law provided no assistance for the medical
profession in its effort to obtain corpses. Without the de-
ceased's prior express authorization, the spouse's or next-of-
kin's desired disposition of the deceased's body was controlling.
Despite the deceased's authorization, there was no assurance,
in the event of disagreement, whether the spouse or next-of-kin
would have the controlling interest in the body's disposition or
whether the deceased's own plan would be deemed reasonable.
The rules varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even
within jurisdictions." Therefore, the best common law solution
was to obtain the consent of both the decedent and the rela-
tives. This, however, was often impractical and delay often
minimized the usefulness of the cadaver.
Some assistance for the medical profession was provided by
the anatomical laws of the nineteenth century.24 The laws pro-
vided for the delivery of bodies of unclaimed indigents and
inmates of governmental institutions to hospitals and medical
schools. But as the medical use of bodies increased, the needs
of related sciences requiring bodies expanded. The develop-
ment of the homograft (transfer of tissue from one human being
to another) procedure has demonstrated that today the number
of corpses provided by the anatomical laws is inadequate.
The donation of one's body by will has also proved ineffec-
tive as a solution to the limited supply of organs for trans-
plants. A disposition by will must await the probate of the will.
The usual delay between the date of death and probate results
in the body becoming useless for transplantation purposes:
The organs such as kidneys and liver must be removed from
the cadaver donor as soon after death as possible - not
within days or even hours but within minutes. At death the
discontinuation of circulation of blood to some organs whose
oxygen demands are extremgly high causes irreversible dam-
age.?
23. Compare Scott v. Riley, 16 Phila. 106 (Pa. C.P., 1883) which stated that "a
person by will can determine absolutely what disposition shall be made of the re-
mains," with Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904) where the court said
that "the paramount right is in the surviving husband."
24. Holland v. Metalious, 198 A.2d 654, 656 (N.H. 1964). The court stated: "At the
same time, the policy of using unclaimed bodies to advance scientific study has been
given recognition over a period beginning at least as early as 1869."
25. Wasmuth & Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human Organ
Transplantation, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 442, 447 (1965).
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
As a result, the most effective means of disposition of an organ
would be by gift executed prior to death pursuant to a statutory
authority.
B. Development of Wisconsin Anatomical Law
Early in the twentieth century, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court embraced the holding of Larson v. Chase,"6 a Minnesota
Supreme Court decision, thus recognizing a quasi-property
interest in cadavers. In subsequent decisions the Wisconsin
court underscored the principle that the deceased's next-of-kin
had certain rights with respect to the body. In Koerber v.
Patek,21 it was held that the complaint of a son who controlled
the disposition of his mother's body stated a proper cause of
action for actual damages where the stomach of the body was
removed without the son's consent. In a later case, Wilde v.
Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light Co.,21 a good faith stan-
dard was set forth where an action was brought by a father
alleging the mishandling of his daughter's corpse following a
streetcar accident. A jury in Wilde had determined that the
defendant had acted in good faith in moving the corpse and the
supreme court approved the instructions given to the jury.
These cases did not, however, indicate what would happen if
the decedent's plan to dispose of his body conflicted with the
intentions of his kin. Absent any statutory directive, the case
law was inadequate.
Wisconsin's first anatomical law was passed in 1863.30 It
provided that the public officer was in charge of disposing of
corpses at public expense. If a body was not claimed for burial
within forty-eight hours by a friend or relative, the public offi-
cer could deliver the body to a member of a county or state
medical society. A recipient-physician was required to use the
body "only for the advancement and promotion of anatomical
science within this state."3 The latest version of this statute,
section 155.02, provides a more limited source of bodies but
26. 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
27. Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905).
28. The Koerber court concluded that the sense of outrage and mental suffering
which directly resulted from the wilful act of the defendant were proper independent
elements for the recovery of compensatory damages.
29. 147 Wis. 129, 132 N.W. 885 (1911).




enlarges the class which may request corpses. The corpse must
be that of a person who was an inmate of a state, county or
municipal institution and was unclaimed by any relative upon
proper notice. The possible recipients may be either of the two
Wisconsin medical schools or an accredited school of mortuary
science.
It is evident that this statute was and is too limited to
provide any real assistance in the expanding anatomical trans-
plant area. Therefore, Wisconsin's first anatomical gift act was
passed in 1961.2 The act permitted any adult of sound mind
to make a lifetime gift of all or part of his body to a medical
school or bank for scientific, medical or educational purposes.
The gift was evidenced by a written instrument witnessed by
two people and was revocable at anytime during the donor's
lifetime. The donee was given a right to accept or reject the gift
and the surviving spouse or next-of-kin could provide funeral
services before delivery of the corpse to the donee. Liability of
any person carrying out invalid written instructions of the
donor was limited if the person acted in good faith in following
the donor's directives.
The Wisconsin anatomical gift act was an attempt to re-
duce the shortage of needed corpses. It left many questions
unanswered, however, and was indicative of the type of statute
which created the need for the UAGA. The act did not specifi-
cally permit a gift to any particular individual donee. The
methods of revocation of the donor's gift were not indicated,
nor was legal protection of the physician carrying out the
donor's intention covered. A definition of death was not at-
tempted. The act ignored any reference to a conflict of interest
when the physician caring for the donor also attended a donee
in immediate need of a transplantation. Finally, conflicts of
law problems where either the donee or donor resided in differ-
ent states were not addressed.
The UAGA became effective in Wisconsin on July 2, 1969.11
The act provides comprehensive coverage for the donation of a
body or any part thereof by means of a written instrument. To
facilitate the operation of the donative procedure, the gift may
be made by document, card or will. A specific donee may or
may not be named. Delivery of the document is not necessary
32. Wis. Laws 1961, ch. 395.
33. Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 90.
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to validate the gift. The card may be carried on the person of
the donor. In Wisconsin, a potential donor may have a decal
affixed to his motor vehicle driver's license indicating he carries
an authorized UAGA donor card on his person.34 Where the gift
is devised, it becomes effective upon the testator's death with-
out waiting for the probate of the will.
Such donation may be made by an adult of all or part of
his body to take effect at death. No indication is given as to
what method, if any, may be used by a minor to donate his
body. Special provisions in Wisconsin's version of the UAGA
(which differ from the parent act) concern the right of revoca-
tion of the gift if the donor is a minor and, under special cir-
cumstances, if the donor is married."5 If the donor dies before
the age of eighteen and is unmarried, either parent may revoke
the gift. If the entire body of the donor is given for purposes of
anatomical research, the gift is revoked unless the surviving
spouse has consented in writing to the disposition. The act does
not specify if such revocation by parent or spouse may be made
prior to death.
An innovative feature of the statute establishes a hierarchy
of related persons who may donate the decedent's body for
anatomical purposes where no contrary intention of the dece-
dent is known nor any opposition to the gift is expressed by any
member of the same or prior class of the hierarchy.36 For exam-
ple, an adult son or daughter may donate a parent's body pro-
vided neither the deceased's spouse nor one of the other chil-
dren of the deceased express opposition to the plan.
The class of approved donees is greatly expanded over the
old anatomical gift act. Among the approved donees are hospi-
tals, physicians or surgeons, accredited medical or dental
schools, medical or dental banks or storage facilities, or speci-
fied individuals for such individuals' personal transplantation
requirements.3 1
The gift may be amended or revoked if the appropriate
document is already delivered to the donee by any of the fol-
lowing: (1) a statement signed by the donor and sent to the
donee, (2) an oral statement made in the presence of two wit-
nesses and communicated to the donee, (3) a statement made
34. Wis. STAT. § 343.17(3)(a) and (b) (1973).
35. Wis. STAT. § 155.06(2) (1973).
36. Wis. STAT. § 155.06(2)(b) (1973).
37. Wis. STAT. § 155.06(3) (1973).
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during terminal illness to the attending physician and commu-
nicated to the donee, or (4) a signed document or card found
with the deceased's personal effects. 8
If the document is still in the possession of the donor, it can
additionally be revoked by destruction, cancellation or mutila-
tion. 9 Also, the gift may be accepted or rejected by the donee.,'
Two critical and controversial areas are covered in subsec-
tions 7(b) and (c). 41 The first regards death; the act refrains
from defining when death occurs. Subsection.7(b) states that
the time of death will be determined by the attending physi-
cian although such physician may not participate in the re-
moval or transplantation of the body part. The second, subsec-
tion 7(c), provides a limitation on civil or criminal liability for
any person who acts in good faith in accordance with the
UAGA.
C. Section 7(b)
The question of time of death is critical to transplantations.
The closer to the time of death that a body organ is removed,
the greater are the chances that the transplantation will be
successful:
In the area of corneal transplantation, where the rejection
reaction is virtually nonexistent, several hours may elapse
between death and removal and storage of the eyes. Skin,
bones and blood vessels similarly may be used many hours
after death. But kidneys deteriorate rapidly and must be ob-
tained from a living donor or soon after cessation of circula-
tion in the donor in order to survive and function. Principles
akin to those controlling kidney transplantation apparently
apply in the field of heart, lung and liver transplantation
which is still in the developmental stage."
On the other hand, the actual point at which life terminates is
not clear and is often difficult to determine. A recent incident
demonstrates the problem.43 A hospital patient who had suf-
fered a severe heart attack was declared clinically dead when
all brain activity ceased. His heart and breathing were artifi-
38. Wis. STAT. § 155.06(6)(a) (1973).
39. Wis. STAT. § 155.06(6)(b) (1973).
40. Wis. STAT. § 155.06(7)(a) (1973).
41. Wis. STAT. § 155.06(7)(b) and (c) (1973) [hereinafter cited as 7(b) and 7(c)].
42. 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRAMCTICE, 19.12 (1973).
43. Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 12, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
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cially maintained while preparation began for surgery to re-
move organs for transplantation. During this preparation, an
attending physician noticed that the "deceased" blinked his
eyes. The patient was quickly taken to the intensive care unit
where his condition stabilized and thereafter improved. By ac-
cepted medical standards death had occurred prior to the pa-
tient's recovery.
The drafters of the UAGA recognized that the legal concep-
tion and articulation of what constitutes death had lagged far
behind the standards of the medical profession." For example,
a legal dictionary defines death as the "total stoppage of the
circulation of the blood and a cessation of the animal and vital
functions consequent thereon."45 But presently it is not uncom-
mon to stimulate the heartbeat by an electric pacemaker or to
cause blood circulation by external cardiac massage." Recent
medical definitions use stoppage of the brain functions as a
more accurate indication of death. The consensus in the medi-
cal profession is that death consists of a state where a condition
of permanent unconsciousness (irreversible coma) exists and
the body functions can no longer continue spontaneously. 7 A
prominent group of physicians48 examined "brain death" and
compiled three criteria which make up an "irreversible coma."
These were a total unawareness to externally applied stimuli
and inner need and complete unresponsiveness, no movements
or breathing, and no reflexes. Additionally, this committee
considered a flat electroencephalogram49 to be "of great confir-
matory value" in the diagnosis of death."
The UAGA drafters decided not to establish a definition of
death. Rather, the act was drafted to permit the attending
physician to make a good faith determination of when death
occurs. A safeguard against the possibility that the life of the
44. UAGA (U.L.A.) § 7, Commissioner's Note, at 40.
45. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 488 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
46. Wasmuth, Organ Transplantation, LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL 393, 408 (1969).
47. Luyties, Suggested Revisions to Clarify the Uncertain Impact of Section 7 of
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act on Determination of Death, 11 ARIz. L. REv. 749
(1969).
48. The Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definitions
of Brain Death.
49. This is the record of an electroencephalograph, an instrument that records the
electrical impulses of the brain and is referred to as an EEG.
50. Capron & Nass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining
Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87, 89 (1972).
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dying donor will be sacrificed prematurely in favor of the donee
was added by the requirement that the time of death should
be determined by a physician who is not participating in the
removal or transplantation operations.
But problems do exist. Proper donors are difficult to obtain:
The source of kidneys for cadaver transplantation is usually
from a patient in the hospital who dies suddenly from unre-
lated causes. Sudden severe brain damage, as seen from mas-
sive hemorrhage or head injury, or death from complicated
heart operations, are the most common situations in which
the cadaver donor kidneys can be salvaged. Such patients can
usually be supported by cardiac massage and/or artificial re-
spiration until it is obvious the situation is hopeless and
death inevitable.'
Another problem is that while the physician must make a good
faith determination of the time of death, there is no require-
ment that this decision must be based on a conventional, medi-
cally acceptable determination. Two contrasting tests for death
demonstrate the significance of the differences between a con-
servative and an unconventional method:
1. The Schwab Test-The procedure used by Dr. Schwab
for pronouncing death using the EEG was evolved for deter-
mining when a patient whose body processes were being sus-
tained artificially could be pronounced dead. His test in-
cludes the absence of spontaneous heartbeat and respiration,
and thus it satisfies the most stringent legal criteria. How-
ever, the flat EEG recording period of 1 hour may involve
substantial risk to the recipient. The longer the surgeon must
wait, the more the donor's heart tissue deteriorates, progres-
sively lessening the chances of a successful transplant, and
thus increasing the surgeon's liability to the recipient's survi-
vors for proceeding without chance of success. Dr. Schwab's
test for death is most beneficial to the donor.
2. The Crafoord Test-Although reports of this Swedish
doctor's kidney transplants are conflicting, it seems he did
use the EEG but proceeded with the kidney transplant before
respiration had stopped. The physicians may pronounce "all
hope lost" on the basis of either flat EEG or an EEG that was
becoming progressively flatter. This procedure withholds all
treatment from the donor and thus denies any possibility of
a recovery similar to that of Landau. Thus, from the point of
51. Wasmuth, Organ Transplantation, LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL 393, 492 (1969).
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view of organ deterioration, this method would be most bene-
ficial to the recipient.2
The act does not indicate whether a physician using the uncon-
ventional Crafoord Test, or even a test considered medically
unreasonable, will be excluded from liability provisions.
Some states have drafted statutory definitions of death.
The first attempt at a legislative resolution of the problem was
made in 1970 by Kansas.5 3 The Kansas statute provides alter-
native definitions of death which are used for all legal purposes
in the state. The first method involves the absence of sponta-
neous respiratory and cardiac function, while the other involves
the absence of spontaneous brain function. Either method
must be based on ordinary medical standard.
A better solution than augmenting the UAGA by each
state's own definition might be provided by the adoption of a
uniform legal definition of death. Such definition must neces-
sarily have a medically sound basis with an adequately flexible
standard within which innovative transplant work of physi-
cians can be performed. A definition arguably fulfilling these
requirements was suggested by the ABA's House of Delegates
at the 1975 Chicago convention. The delegates passed a resolu-
tion recommending a uniform legal definition of death as a
state of "a human body with irreversible, total cessation of
brain function. 5 4
D. Section 7(c)
The second critical area of the UAGA is section 7(c). This
section provides the attending physician with freedom from
civil or criminal liability if the physician acts in good faith.
Such immunity was deemed necessary by the UAGA drafters
so that physicians would not be intimidated when faced with
the prospect of performing an innovative and risky transplant
operation. The problem with such a standard parallels that of
the determination of death. The question is how the law can
control a transplant procedure which, while entered into in
good faith by the physician, is unconventional by the standards
of the rest of the medical profession.
52. Comment, Liability and the Heart Transplant, 6 Hous. L. REv. 85, 98-99
(1968).
53. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971).
54. Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 25, 1975, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
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The UAGA received its first litigational test in Wisconsin
in the case of Williams v. Hofmann.5 The central issue con-
cerned the constitutionality of section 7(c) in the Wisconsin
version of the UAGA. The case was appealed to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upon the overruling of plaintiff's demurrer to
the affirmative defenses interposed by the defendants to the
complaint.
The plaintiff's wife had been admitted to Milwaukee
County General Hospital and placed under the care of one of
the defendants, Dr. James Hofmann. Mrs. Williams was
placed on a mechanical respirator after her breathing suddenly
stopped. The next morning, a Saturday, Dr. Hofmann told the
plaintiff that his wife had died and secured from the plaintiff
a written consent for the removal of his wife's kidneys. Plaintiff
subsequently learned, while making funeral arrangements,
that his wife was not actually pronounced dead until the fol-
lowing Monday morning. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that
his wife was kept alive by means of life supportive devices until
9:00 a.m. on Monday, even though Dr. Hofmann pronounced
her dead at 8:20 a.m. and the kidney removal operation began
at 8:35 a.m.
Williams sought recovery of damages based on two theories.
One was brought in the capacity of special administrator to his
wife's estate alleging assault and battery and negligence. The
second action was brought in his individual capacity for "in-
tentional mutilation of a corpse, negligent mutilation of a
corpse and negligence in communicating an erroneous and pre-
mature death message."56
The defendants (Dr. Hofmann, Dr. Kauffman - the trans-
plant surgeon, and Milwaukee County) answered, denying
most of the complaint's material allegations and asserting
three affirmative defenses. Plaintiff demurred to the affirma-
tive defense that the defendants acted in good faith reliance
upon the consent signed by plaintiff and were, according to
section 155.06(7)(c) of the UAGA, immune from liability.
The court's analysis, beginning with a general discussion of
the UAGA, emphasized that the act applied to a transplant
operation after the death of the donor.57 The only time that the
55. 66 Wis. 2d 145, 223 N.W.2d 844 (1974).
56. Id. at 149, 223 N.W.2d at 846.
57. Id. at 150, 223 N.W.2d at 846.
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act applies to living human beings was for the purpose of deter-
mining the time of the donor's death. Therefore, the court rea-
soned that since the act did not apply to treatment of the donor
prior to death, nor to treatment of the live donee, the act's
liability limitation did not extend to such treatment.
From this reasoning the court concluded that since the
plaintiff's first action brought as special administrator arose
from treatment while his wife was still alive, plaintiff's demur-
rer to the affirmative defense should have been sustained by
the trial court.
Plaintiffs second action was brought to recover damages for
injuries which defendants allegedly caused to the body after
Mrs. Williams had been pronounced dead. The UAGA does
apply to this action, and the court dealt with the constitution-
ality of section 155.06(7)(c) of the UAGA. This was the first
time this issue had been appealed to a state supreme court in
any jurisdiction which had passed the UAGA.
The court analyzed four separate constitutional questions
in reaching its decision that section 155.06(7)(c) was constitu-
tional, and may provide a defense for the defendants if they
could demonstrate at the trial court level that they acted in
good faith. Plaintiff's first contention was that Article I, sec-
tion 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution58 was violated by section
155.06(7)(c) in that the statute abrogated the rights of injured
persons by replacing the present negligence standard of care in
medical malpractice actions with a lesser standard of good
faith.59 The court summarily dismissed this argument by re-
minding the plaintiff that section 155.06(7)(c) did not apply to
actions brought concerning the medical treatment of the donor
prior to death. Plaintiff's right to sue for malpractice or assault
and battery were not affected by section 155.06(7)(c).
Plaintiff's second contention was that the term "good faith"
was unconstitutionally vague as used in section 155.06(7)(c).10
In dismissing this argument the court looked at the criteria set
58. WIs. CONST. art. I, § 9:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs
which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain
justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without
denial, promptly and without delay, comformably to the laws.
59. 66 Wis. 2d at 151, 223 N.W.2d at 847.
60. Id. at 152, 223 N.W.2d at 847.
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forth in earlier Wisconsin cases that were used to determine if
a civil statute was void for vagueness:
A statute is not necessarily void merely because it . . .pre-
scribes a general course of conduct . . . and questions may
arise as to its applicability, and opinions may differ in respect
of what falls within its terms ....
Unless a statute is so vague and uncertain that it is impossi-
ble to execute it or to ascertain the legislative intent with
reasonable certainty, it is valid .6
The term "good faith" prescribes a general course of conduct
which can be construed only by a careful analysis of the facts.
By such analysis, the good faith standard can be applied so
that the statute may be executed. The court buttressed its
reasoning by citing the Wilde case61 where a good faith stan-
dard was approved for jury instructions in a case involving the
alleged mishandling of a corpse.
Plaintiff's third argument was that section 155.06(7)(c)
denied him equal protection of the law by bestowing a special
immunity on transplant surgeons." He argued that there was
no rational justification in granting the immunity in transplant
operations and not in ordinary medical malpractice situations.
The court reasserted that the surgeon was not immunized dur-
ing the entire transplant operation, but only after the donor
died. The rational justification for the immunity was the public
purpose of encouraging the removal of anatomical parts for
transplant and research.
Plaintiff's final argument was whether section 155.06(7)(c)
extended the limitation of liability to persons in other states
acting in good faith in accord with the terms of "the anatomical
gift laws of another state."64 This issue was not raised at the
trial level, therefore no standing existed with which to raise the
issue before the supreme court. The court dismissed this argu-
ment by stating "that section 155.06(7)(c) does not empower
foreign jurisdictions to make Wisconsin laws" but "only recog-
nizes the lawfulness" of similar actions taken in other jurisdic-
tions in accordance with such jurisdictions' laws.65
61. Id. at 152-53, 223 N.W.2d at 847-48.
62. Wilde v. Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light Co., 147 Wis. 129, 132 N.W.
885 (1911).
63. 66 Wis. 2d at 154, 223 N.W. at 848.
64. Id. at 155, 223 N.W. at 849.
65. Id. at 156, 223 N.W. at 849.
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The Hofmann decision recognized the constitutionality of
the good faith immunity granted to physicians removing ana-
tomical parts pursuant to the UAGA. The court also recognized
that good faith must be determined by analyzing the facts of
the particular case. What factors are involved in determining
if the conduct was in good faith? A commentator gives some
guidance:
The first step in deciding whether such a physician is some-
how protected by the UAGA's disclaimer is to determine
whether he acts in accordance with section 7(b) (directing
that "the time of death shall be determined by a physician
who tends the donor. . ."), when he makes any determina-
tion of death. The second step is to determine whether a
negligent act can be committed in good faith. If both ques-
tions can be answered affirmatively, the determiner of death
should be immune from liability, provided, of course, that the
determination is alleged to be only negligent - not intention-
ally wrongful."6
The key question is whether a negligent act can be commit-
ted in good faith. The Wisconsin court did not directly answer
this question in Hofmann. Rather, it pointed out that "while
negligence is not per se bad faith conduct, the extent of and
character of the negligence" were factors to be utilized in
weighing bad faith. 7 By indirection, the decision implies that
a negligent act may, in fact, be committed in good faith. It is
the scope and character of the negligence which will determine
when good faith no longer exists. Such a standard does offer the
physician some protection. A single act of negligence does not
seem to destroy the physician's immunity while removing ana-
tomical parts from a body. Where more than one act of negli-
gence occurs, the solution is unclear and the answer is left for
future judicial interpretation.
While the good faith immunity offers protection to physi-
cians, the extent of this immunity was limited by the Hofmann
decision. The court construed the UAGA narrowly and held
that the immunity of section 155.06(7)(c) should only extend
to the determination of death and the actual removal of the
66. Luyties, Suggested Revisions to Clarify the Uncertain Impact of Section 7 of
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act on Determination of Death, 11 AMz. L. REV. 749, 761-
62 (1969).
67. 66 Wis. 2d at 153, 223 N.W.2d at 848.
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body part from the deceased. The court decided not to extend
the act's applicability to the entire transplant operation and,
by doing so, restricted the scope of its protection. The limita-
tion is consistent with the UAGA as it relates to anatomical
law.
I. LIVING DONOR SITUATIONS
The scope and nature of the legal problems involved when
a living person donates a body part differ from those that exist
where the donor is deceased. First, the possibilities for donation
are limited by the ability of the donor to function without the
organ. The most apparent situation is that of the kidney trans-
plant operation because the kidney is the only vital organ
which can be removed from a healthy living donor without
jeopardizing the donor's life.6" Secondly, there does not exist
the statutory control comparable to that of the UAGA. Any
liability on the part of the surgeon performing the operation
will be subject to medical malpractice guidelines. Such liabil-
ity will not be discussed in this article. Rather, the peculiar
problems in the kidney transplantation area which have arisen
when obtaining the requisite consent for the transplantation
from the donor will be discussed.
For every surgical intrusion into the body, consent is a criti-
cal legal consideration. A surgeon's liability for a non-
emergency procedure is, however, precluded by the patient's
voluntary, informed consent. The underlying spirit of this legal
axiom was articulated by Justice Cardozo in 1914; "Every
human being of adult years-and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body."6 Legally
sufficient consent, however, requires more than mere affirm-
ance of the treatment. The medical procedure and its attend-
ant risks must be explained to the patient.70 The amount of
68. Hamburger & Crosnier, Moral and Ethical Problems in Transplantation, in
HUMAN TRANSPLANTATION 37, 38 (F. Rapaport & J. Dausset ed. 1968).
69. Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
70. See Serianni v..Anna, 55 Misc. 2d 553, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1967). A
mother donated one of her kidneys to her son whose kidneys had both been removed.
The transplant was successful. The plaintiff mother, however, initiated an action
alleging that her health was impaired by the loss of one of her kidneys. The court held
that notwithstanding the doctor's malpractice which precipitated the need for the
transplant, a donor does not have a cause of action against the doctor if the donation
was made voluntarily. This case raises the question as to how much information the
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disclosure required to discharge the doctor's duty varies not
only with the treatment, but with the individual patient's abil-
ity to appreciate the significance of that information.7
Significant legal questions have arisen in transplantation
cases, and have resulted in conflicting decisions where the
donor has lacked the requisite capacity to consent to the opera-
tion because of minority of age or mental incapacity, and a
court has been petitioned to permit the transplant. The prob-
lem is both a legal and emotional one. The donee is critically
ill and in need of a transplanted kidney. Often the donee has
had both of his natural kidneys removed and must use a di-
alysis machine. The only possible compatible donee is an indi-
vidual who lacks the ability according to the law to consent to
the operation. Is it possible for a minor or legally incompetent
donor to agree to the operation despite the legal insufficiency
of his consent if the court finds he is able to understand the
significance of the treatment? Is a parent's or guardian's con-
sent sufficient to authorize the operation? Though there is no
physical benefit to the donor, is a psychological benefit suffi-
cient to permit guardian authorization? These are a few of the
questions which the courts have raised in deciding the issue.
The question of consent by a legally incapable individual
was first litigated in Massachusetts in 1957. The cases involved
identical teenage twins.7" All three cases held that the hospital
and surgeon could proceed with the operation on consent of the
parents and of both twins without incurring civil liability. In
the Masden decision, the court determined that sufficient ben-
efit would flow to the donor twin so as to provide adequate
basis for the operation:
I am satisfied from the testimony of the psychiatrist that
grave emotional impact may be visited upon Leonard if the
defendants refuse to perform the operation and Leon should
doctor must disclose to discharge his duty so that a patient may knowingly and volun-
tarily consent to a transplantation.
71. See 2 D. LOUISELL AND H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 19.12 (1973) as to
the special care that must be taken by the physician to insure that the consent of a
prisoner-patient is truly voluntary.
72. Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651, Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. (June 12, 1957);
Hushey v. Harrison, No. 68666, Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. (Aug. 30, 1957); Foster v.
Harrison, No. 68674, Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. (Nov. 20, 1957) discussed in Curran, A
Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1959).
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die, as apparently he will. . .. Such emotional disturbance
could well affect the health and physical well-being of Leon-
ard for the remainder of his life. I therefore find that the
operation is necessary for the continued good health and well-
being of Leonard and that in performing the operation the
defendants are conferring a benefit upon Leonard as well as
upon Leon. 3
The courts' analyses were based generally on the effect which
the operation would have on the donor twins and specifically
on the benefit conferred upon such donors. But equally signifi-
cant in the courts' analyses was the fact that the donors were
capable of an informed and voluntary consent. The Foster
court stated:
Carl [the healthy twin] testified before me. He is a boy of
fourteen with good understanding and intelligence. He has
been fully informed of, and understands the nature of the
operation and its possible risks and consequences. He has
talked with a donor of a kidney in a similar operation. The
mother of the boys consents to the operation. Carl and his
mother desire that the operation take place and Carl's con-
sent to it is the result of his own decision, free from pressure
or coercion, made with admirable courage, generosity, and
appreciation of the factors involved.74
Significant legal questions have arisen in transplantation
cases where the patient-donor has been a minor or incompe-
tent. As a general rule both minors and mental incompetents
are incapable of satisfying the requirements of informed con-
sent. A court is petitioned to determine whether to allow a
transplant because of the legal difference between a therapeu-
tic operation on a minor or incompetent, and a non-therapeutic
operation. Parental consent is sufficient to permit therapeutic
treatment of minors and incompetents. This is because the
treatment is for the benefit of the child. In non-therapeutic
operations, such as transplants, there is no physical benefit to
the donor. The problem is definitely legal as well as emotional.
There is authority, however, for the proposition that paren-
tal permission is sufficient to authorize a non-therapeutic oper-
ation after an independent and objective investigation.75
73. No. 68651, Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. at 4.
74. No. 68674, Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. at 2-3.
75. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
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A. The Court's Authority
In Strunk v. Strunk,71 the Kentucky Court of Appeals per-
mitted the transplant of a kidney from a 27 year old incompe-
tent ward of the state to his 28 year old married brother. The
Superior Court of Connecticut decided similarly in Hart v.
Brown,7 where the donor and donee were identical twins, aged
seven years. In neither case did the donor have the understand-
ing and intelligence to make an independent decision concern-
ing the operation. The courts invoked the equitable doctrine of
"substituted judgment" to judicially authorize the transplants.
The Strunk case examined statutory restrictions on a
guardian's authority to act for an incompetent and recognized
that the guardian had no power to consent to a transplant
unless the life of the ward was in jeopardy.
Substituted judgment was first recognized in this country
by the court of equity in the nineteenth century to permit a
chancellor to deal with the estate of an incompetent. 7 The
courts in Hart and Strunk decided that the doctrine could
apply to the personal affairs of the incompetent and therefore
would apply to the transplant situation. Substituted judgment,
however, has traditionally been utilized only with regard to the
ward's proprietary interest." The doctrine is generally thought
to have first originated in England in the case of Ex parte
Whitbread,'" where the court authorized payments out of an
incompetent's estate to be applied to his needy brothers and
sisters. Courts which have permitted relief through use of the
doctrine have done so where the estate of the ward has been
much larger than the ward requires8' and conduct prior to the
ward's incompetency indicated that the ward would act in such
a manner, had he the use of his faculties, in order to assist a
needy relative8 2 or for purposes of avoiding unnecessary estate
76. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky., 1969).
77. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
78. In re Willoughby, 11 Paige 257, 4 Ch. S. 59 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).
79. Note, Equity - Transplants - Power of Court to Authorize Removal of Kidney
from Mental Incompetent for Transplantation into Brother, 16 WAYNE ST. L. REv.
1460, 1474 (1970).
80. 2 Meriv. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch., 1816).
81. In In re Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415, 162 N.E. 471 (1928), the incompetent received
annual income of $50,000. The court was cognizant of this fact when it applied the
doctrine of substituted judgment.
82. In re Tash, 126 Misc. 764, 214 N.Y.S. 631 (1926).
[Vol. 59
COMMENTS
or inheritance taxes . 3
Several courts, however, have expressly refused to apply the
doctrine absent any statutory authority. 4 It is the viewpoint of
these courts that statutory authority exists in lieu of the com-
mon law and all authority of guardians must come from the
statutes:
The enactment of Section 398 of the Probate Code would not
have been necessary if the Probate Court could have exer-
cised the power granted therein without such enactment.
Moreover, such section sets out in detail the conditions under
which the charitable gift may be made, and would seem to
negative the doctrine of substituted judgment. It is our view
that this section of the Probate Code strongly indicates the
legislative intent to confer upon the court a power and au-
thority, which it was believed the court did not have prior to
such enactment, namely, to make gifts out of the income
from the ward's estate. 5
There are reasons for skepticism on the use of the doctrine of
substituted judgment absent statutory authority. First, the
cases show that it is an extremely relative and subjective pro-
cess to convince the court that the ward would have so acted
had he the capability. Secondly, the doctrine offers possibili-
ties of being extended beyond its original limitations: "It is a
dangerous doctrine for a court to so substitute its judgment.
The doctrine too far advanced might lead to gross abuse."86
It is the application of the doctrine to the transplant situa-
tion in Hart and Strunk which, argumentively, leads to "gross
abuse." For a court to be convinced that an incompetent would
be willing to share part of his excessive proprietary estate with
a distant relative may legitimately be inferred from previous
conduct indicating a concern for the individual. On the other
hand, to infer from friendship or affection a willingness to do-
nate a part of one's body to another person absent an unequivo-
cal statement to that effect while competent, is an entirely
different situation. It is even more abusive to infer such gener-
83. In re Myles' Estate, 57 Misc. 2d 101, 291 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1968).
84. In re Beilstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 62 N.E.2d 205 (1945); In re Guardianship of
Estate of Neal, 406 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
85. In re Guardianship of Estate of Neal, 406 S.W.2d 496, 502 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966).
86. In re Beilstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 402, 62 N.E.2d 205, 207 (1945).
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osity to a person who never had the ability to understand what
was being asked of him.
B. Benefit Conferred
Once the doctrine of substituted judgment was found appl-
icable to transplant situations, the courts in Hart and Strunk
analyzed the issue of whether sufficient benefit would accrue
to the donor. Neither court could find any actual physical ben-
efit to the donor resulting from the operation, but each dis-
cussed the supposed minimal risks involved. In the Strunk
case, it was noted that "[tjhe risks incurred by the donor are
therefore very limited, but they are a reality, even if, until now,
there have been no reports of complications endangering the
life of a donor anywhere in the world."87
The benefits which these courts recognized involved the
positive psychological effect that would accrue to the donor. In
Hart, the court noted that a psychiatric examination of the
seven year old identical twin showed that: "[T]he donor
would be better off in a family that was happy than in a family
that was distressed and. . . it would be a very great loss to the
donor if the donee were to die from her illness."88 In addition,
it was noted that the donor was informed of the operation and
was, to the extent of her capacity, willing to donate her kid-
ney.89 The Kentucky court in Strunk decided that the operation
would be beneficial to the incompetent because his well being
would be jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother
than by the removal of a kidney.
Are these "benefits" mere fictions which the courts indulge
in to authorize a transplant operation? It is questionable that
a person of that mental age is capable of developing such bonds
with a relative so that the loss of the relative would necessarily
cause permanent psychological scars. The long term physical
effects to a donor of a kidney transplant are yet unknown:
[I]n the case of the living donor, certain serious situations
arise which must be weighed very carefully. As with any surg-
ical procedure, removal of a kidney for transplantation into
87. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky., 1969).
88. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 388, 289 A.2d 386, 390 (1972).
89. Id.
90. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky., 1969).
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another person carries an inherent risk to the donor. Perhaps
more significant is the possible long-term effect upon the
donor. Presumably a healthy person, he might in the future
develop serious renal disease and be himself in the same posi-
tion as the person to whom he has donated his other kidney.'
Subsequent to Strunk, the Louisiana intermediate appel-
late court in In re Richardson 2 refused to find a benefit to the
donor even though the court assumed it had the power to per-
mit the operation. The facts in Richardson involved a potential
donor who was a seventeen year old mental retardate and his
32 year old sister. The court noted that the brother was the
most acceptable donor in that the present possibility of rejec-
tion was approximately four percent over a period of about four
years. The court also noted, however, that Louisiana law af-
fords considerable protection to the property rights of minors. 3
It would therefore be inconceivable to afford less protection to
the minor where the loss of an organ is involved "unless such
loss be in the best interest of the minor."9 4 The court found no
such benefit from the occurrence of the operation:
Counsel for plaintiff argues the transplant could be in Roy's
best interest because, if it is successful, Beverly could take
care of Roy after the deaths of both Mr. and Mrs. Richardson.
Such an event is not only highly speculative but, in view of
all of the facts highly unlikely. We find that the surgical
intrusion and loss of a kidney clearly would be against Roy's
best interest 5
C. The Wisconsin Court
The Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced with the living
donor transplant situation for the first time in the case of In re
Guardianship of Pescinski9 9 The Wisconsin response arose
from an appeal of a Washington County probate court's denial
91. Wasmuth, Organ Transplantation, LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL 393, 404 (1969).
92. 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1973), appeal denied, 284 So. 2d 338 (1973).
93. Id. at 187:
Under LSA-C.C. Arts, 1476 and 1477, an unmarried minor is prohibited from
making any inter vivos donations of his property. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 4275 unequi-
vocally prohibits the donation of a minor's property by his tutor and, when as
in this case both parents are alive and not divorced or judicially separated, LSA-
C.C.P. Art. 4501 gives to the father of a minor only those powers enjoyed by a
tutor of a minor.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975).
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of a petition from the general guardian of Richard Pescinski to
permit the incompetent to donate a kidney to his sister, Elaine,
aged thirty-eight and mother of six, who had both kidneys
removed four years prior to the petition due to severe kidney
failure. Though previously sustained by dialysis treatments
two or three times per week, the progressive deterioration of her
condition made a transplant critical. There was no prospect of
a kidney transplant from a deceased donor and all family mem-
bers, other than her brother, were rejected as unsuitable do-
nors. The potential donor was thirty-nine, mentally incompe-
tent, and a ward of a state institution. As a result of court
approved medical tests, it was established that the incompe-
tent was in excellent health, and would be exposed to almost
no medical risks as a donor. Court permission was sought to
proceed with the operation. The trial court refused such per-
mission, holding that there was no statutory authority for such
an order and rejected any inherent equitable power of either
the probate court or personal guardian to consent to the opera-
tion without a showing of benefit to the ward. The supreme
court affirmed.
The court cited, but refused to follow the Kentucky court's
adoption of the doctrine of substituted judgment as a sufficient
basis for judicial authorization of transplant operations. The
doctrine, the majority held, was to be limited to its historical
role, any further extension would be unwarranted:
Historically, the substituted judgment doctrine was used to
allow gifts of the property of an incompetent. If applied liter-
ally, it would allow a trial court, or this court, to change the
designation on a life insurance policy or make an election for
an incompetent widow, without the requirement of a statute
authorizing these acts and contrary to prior decisions of this
court."
While the Wisconsin court declined to permit a kidney
transplant from an incompetent donor, it did hint that under
proper circumstances it might decide differently. It is signifi-
cant that the facts in Pescinski did not provide an advanta-
geous setting for a precedental decision. In the first place, the
age of the potential donor heightened the attendant risks of the
transplant operation. Secondly, there was little indication of
any close emotional relationship between the brother and sister
97. Id. at 8, 226 N.W.2d at 182.
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from which the court could have inferred a psychological bene-
fit to the brother. However, it seems that the most crucial fact
in Pescinski is the absence of any manifestation of consent on
the part of the potential donor: "No evidence in the record
indicates that Richard consented to the transplant. Absent
that consent, there is no question that the trial court's conclu-
sion that it had no power to approve the operation must be
sustained."98 Therefore, while the Wisconsin court refused to
recognize the substituted judgment doctrine, it seemed to
imply that in a proper situation it might permit the operation.
Such decision would depend upon the relation of the parties to
each other and any actual manifestations of consent from the
potential donor.
By failing to distinguish "real consent" from "legal con-
sent," the court left unanswered a serious question. The lack
of consent was a reason for not allowing a transplant; however,
the incompetent could not have consented. The reasoning pro-
cess utilized by the court fails to resolve the issue of whether
an incompetent may ever consent.
Justice Day disagreed with the majority. Citing with ap-
proval the substantive conclusion of Strunk, Justice Day be-
lieved that the Wisconsin court possessed adequate equitable
authority to permit a kidney transplant from an incompetent.99
However, certain definite standards were suggested by the Jus-
tice which he believed could and should be met in each case
before the court utilized its authority. The facts of Pescinski,
it was asserted, met the proposed guidelines:
[1] a strong showing . . .that without the kidney trans-
plant the proposed donee or recipient stands to suffer death;
[2] that reasonable steps have been taken to try and ac-
quire a kidney from other sources;
[3] that the incompetent proposed-donor, is closely related
by blood to the proposed donee, such as a brother or sister;
[4] showing should be made that the donor, if competent
would most probably consent because of normal ties of fam-
ily;
98. Id. at 7, 226 N.W.2d at 181.
99. Id. at 11, 226 N.W.2d at 182.
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[5] that the proposed incompetent donor is in good health;
[6] that the operation is one of minimal risk to the donor
and that the donor could function normally on one kidney
following such operation.100
With such guidelines established and met in Pescinski, Justice
Day held that the guardian ad litem's concern that mental
institutions would deteriorate to mere storehouses for spare
human parts was unnecessary.' 0
Another approach to resolving the problem would be the
passage of a relevant statute. The state of Michigan does have
statutes based largely upon the 1959 Massachusetts cases
which are worthy of note. In Michigan, an adult who is under
guardianship as a mental incompetent may give one of his
kidneys to a member of his immediate family upon order of the
probate court, provided the court determines the prospective
donor is sufficiently competent to understand the probable
consequences.' °2 Another statute provides similarly for a minor
aged fourteen years or more, as long as the probate court has
appointed a guardian to protect the minor's interests.0 3
m. CONCLUSION
The area of anatomical transplantation will require a uni-
fied strategy that encompasses both the living and deceased
donor as the need for transplant organs continues to increase.
Presently the law utilizes paradoxical approaches. On one
hand, there exists the necessity to face the increasing shortage
of suitable organs for transplantation. The Uniform Anatomi-
cal Gift Act is an innovation and has done much to clarify the
law in the deceased donor area. To alleviate the problem of an
inadequate supply of replacement organs, at least one radical
solution has been suggested:
We propose herein perhaps for the first time that the laws be
broadened to authorize the several states to dispose of all or
part of the remains of selected individuals after death, so as
to make available a continuing supply of kidneys, hearts,
100. Id. at 10-11, 226 N.W.2d at 183.
101. Id. at 11, 226 N.W.2d at 183.
102. CoMP. LAW ANNOT. MICH. § 701.19a.
103. COMP. LAW ANNOT. MICH. § 701.10b.
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other organs and tissues, even of cadavers to supply all the
needs .... 104
This proposal would require a re-thinking of the traditional law
regarding cadavers.
Living donor transplants have and will continue to provide
another avenue whereby lives are saved through organ trans-
plants, but here lies the necessity for courts and legislatures to
act with prudence. While a competent adult has the right to
donate his body as he may please, the courts must not on their
initiative permit such a donation from an individual, legally
incompetent to consent, without a close scrutiny of all the cir-
cumstances. It is the court's foremost duty to protect the inter-
est of its ward. Where a court's "sympathies and emotions are
torn between a compassion to aid an ailing young man and a
duty to fully protect unfortunate members of society,""1 5 the
decision must be made in favor of such unfortunate
individuals.
DAVID J. MATYAS
104. Gelfand, Modern Concepts of Property in a Dead Body, LEGAL MEDICINE
ANNUAL 229, 242-43 (1971).
105. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky., 1969) (Steinfeld, J., dissenting).
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